

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 135881

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 (DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE)

TAGS: PARM, PFOR, UR

SUBJECT: US-USSR CONSULTATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

REF: STATE 100008, STATE 100009

1. SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR VORONTSOV CALLED ON ACDA
DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FLOYD JUNE 9 AND HANDED OVER
RESPONSE TO US QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ON SOVIET DRAFT CW
CONVENTION PASSED PRIVATELY LAST AUGUST (REF TELS).
VORONTSOV MADE NO ACCOMPANYING ORAL PRESENTATION EXCEPT
TO NOTE THAT SOVIET RESPONSE PROPOSED FURTHER CONSULTATIONS
WITH EXPERTS BEFORE CCD RECONVENES IN GENEVA JUNE 24.

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2. FLOYD COMMENTED ON PERSONAL BASIS (AND LATER CONFIRMED TO SOVIETS BY TELEPHONE) THAT HE SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING CONSULTATIONS IN TIME FRAME SUGGESTED BY SOVIETS, AND THAT IN ANY CASE IT REMAINED PREMATURE TO CONSIDER BRINGING EXPERTS INTO PROCESS AT CURRENT STAGE. HOWEVER, AS KLEIN HAD STATED IN APRIL (REF A), WE BELIEVED THAT US AND SOVIET CCD DELS CONSTITUTED APPROPRIATE CHANNEL FOR FURTHER CW CONSULTATIONS, AND WE WOULD EXPECT IN DUE COURSE TO HAVE COMMENTS ON USSR RESPONSE FOR US DEL TO TRANSMIT TO SOVIET DEL AT GENEVA.

3. TEXT OF SOVIET RESPONSE (IN UNOFFICIAL ACDA TRANSLATION) FOLLOWS: QUOTE

1. MOSCOW TAKES NOTE OF THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE THAT THE USA IS RESOLVED AS BEFORE TO ACT TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS IN THE LIMITATION OF CHEMICAL ARMS, AND AWAITS CONCRETE ACTIONS IN THIS DIRECTION IN ORDER TO ACCELERATE CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT INITIATIVE ON CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THIS QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974.

2. IN ITS PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM THE SOVIET UNION FIRMLY ADHERES TO A LINE OF GUARANTEEING EQUAL NATIONAL SECURITY TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONVENTION AND OF EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR RECEIVING ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION TRANSMITTED TO THE AMERICAN SIDE ON AUGUST 6, 1974 WAS DEVELOPED WITH PRECISELY THIS IN CONSIDERATION.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE CRITERIA USED FOR DETERMINING WHICH CHEMICAL AGENTS SHOULD BE BANNED, WE ARE READY TO EXAMINE CONCRETE IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE ON FORMULATIONS CONCERNING A GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION. AS REGARDS A CRITERION OF TOXICITY, WE CONSIDER THAT IT NOT ONLY CAN SERVE AS A USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO A GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION, BUT ALSO IS NECESSARY BECAUSE IT LIMITS THE SPHERE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS REGARDED AS THE MOST DANGEROUS AND LETHAL.

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THE MEANING OF THE CRITERION OF TOXICITY GIVEN IN THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION SUFFICIENTLY FULLY LIMITS THE SPHERE OF ALL KNOWN, AND THE MOST DANGEROUS AND LETHAL, CHEMICAL AGENTS POSSESSED IN THE ARSENALS OF VARIOUS STATES. HERE, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD IN MIND THAT LEWISITE, WHOSE INHALATORY TOXICITY IS COMPARABLE WITH MUSTARD GAS, IS INCLUDED AMONG SUCH AGENTS. HYDROCYANIC ACID

AND ITS WATER COMPOUNDS ARE REALLY BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF THE BAN ENVISAGED BY THE DRAFT CONVENTION, INASMUCH AS SUCH AGENTS (FOR EXAMPLE, CHLORINE, ETHYLENE OXIDE, AND OTHERS) (WHILE) BEING LETHAL UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, DO NOT FIGURE AMONG THE HIGHLY TOXIC (AGENTS) AND THEY ARE WIDELY UTILIZED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

IN LIGHT OF THIS, AND ALSO CONSIDERING THAT THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 FORBIDS APPLICATION IN WAR OF ALL KINDS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WE DO NOT SEE (ANY) BASIS TO CONSIDER THE APPROACH PROPOSED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT

"UNBALANCED." AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE READY TO EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE CONCERNING MAKING THE QUANTITATIVE MEANING OF THE CRITERION OF TOXICITY MORE PRECISE.

4. THE IDEA PUT FORWARD BY THE AMERICAN SIDE OF APPLICATION OF "A PHASED APPROACH" TO BANNING ACTIVITY WITH REGARD TO CHEMICAL AGENTS, AND PRECISELY OF BEGINNING WITH A BAN ON PRODUCTION WITH A SUBSEQUENT MOVE TO ELIMINATING STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, RAISES SERIOUS DOUBTS, INASMUCH AS THE SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION, FROM WHICH STOCKS OF WEAPONS ALREADY ACCUMULATED WOULD BE EXCLUDED, WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY NARROWED. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST SUCH AN APPROACH RAISED BY STATES THAT DO NOT POSSESS STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN CONNECTION WITH THE OPINION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE ON THE INSUFFICIENCY OF A TWO-YEAR PERIOD FOR ELIMINATION OF ACCUMULATED STOCKS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS, WE ARE READY TO EXAMINE ITS IDEAS ON WHAT TIME PERIOD IT CONSIDERS NECESSARY.

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5. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION OF FULFILLMENT BY STATES OF AGREEMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM, THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET SIDE IS THAT IT IS FEASIBLE TO BASE A SYSTEM OF GUARANTEES ON NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES REFLECTED IN ARTICLES IV-VII OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WANTED TO DIRECT THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE TO WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 403, PRESENTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO THE CCD ON JUNE 28, 1973, ON THE MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF FULFILLMENT OF THE CONVENTION ON BANNING DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND ACCUMULATION OF STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION--PROVISIONS OF WHICH WERE APPLIED IN THIS DRAFT CONVENTION. AS REGARDS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO EXCHANGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION, ITS

CHARACTER AND VOLUME WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE PARTICIPANT STATES THEMSELVES IN THE PROCESS OF CONSULTING ONE ANOTHER, DEPARTING FROM THE TASK OF GUARANTEEING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN FULFILLMENT OF OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM. WE ARE READY TO EXAMINE THE IDEAS OF THE USA ON THIS QUESTION.

6. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE AMERICAN SIDE (CONCERNING THE PREAMBLE, TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROVISIONS, CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AMENDMENTS) CONCERN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR NEW DRAFT AND THE 1972 DRAFT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE DIFFERENCES ARE BASICALLY EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THAT A PARTIAL COMPASS OF PROHIBITION IS ENVISAGED IN THE NEW DRAFT. IF, HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN SIDE CONSIDERS IT USEFUL TO RETURN TO SOME OF THE FORMULATIONS OF THE 1972 DRAFT, THEN WE ARE READY TO EXAMINE ITS CONCRETE IDEAS ON THIS SCORE.

7. IN TRANSMITTING CLARIFICATIONS TO THE AMERICAN SIDE ON QUESTIONS IT HAS RAISED WE SHOULD NOTE THAT SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS TOUCH TECHNICAL ASPECTS WHICH COULD BEST BE EXAMINED WITH DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF SPECIALISTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET SIDE RECALLS ITS PROPOSAL TO CONDUCT AN EXCHANGE OF OPINION ON THIS QUESTION AT THE LEVEL OF U.S. AND SOVIET CCD REPRESENTATIVES. WE PROPOSE THAT SUCH A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH COUNTRIES WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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PARTICIPATION OF APPROPRIATE EXPERTS BE HELD IN THE FIRST HALF OF JUNE OF THIS YEAR, THAT IS, SOME TIME BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT SESSION OF THE CCD. UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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